Equipment from the Polish factory ended up in russia

This story began in late 2025. StateWatch journalists examined customs data regarding the supply to russia of EU-manufactured equipment subject to sanctions, intended for the production of missiles, suicide drones and other weapons used by the aggressor state on the front line and against civilians.

 

Among tens of thousands of daily transactions, the Polish factory Famot Pleszew caught our attention. A company with an impeccable reputation in the EU, which has been manufacturing high-precision metalworking machines for decades. Machines capable of working with parts of complex geometry, which are critical in the production of components for missile systems and drones.

 

These are machines with HS codes 8458.11 and 8457.10 – horizontal lathes and multi-functional machining centres with numerical control. In the international classification, they are classified as High Priority Items – high-risk products that can be used in military production. According to customs data, during the war, up to 30 November 2024, equipment manufactured by a Polish plant worth at least $1.2 million was supplied to Russia.

 

Colleagues from the Polish publication Frontstory joined the investigation. Together with them, the scheme for circumventing sanctions via third countries was unravelled.

Pleszew, a small town of 16,000 people in Poland, is largely focused on industry. Among other businesses, it is home to Famot Pleszew, a manufacturer of CNC machine tools. The factory has been in operation since 1877 and was privatised in 1999.

 

The new owner is DMG MORI, a German-Japanese corporation founded in Tokyo. In April 2024, Famot was renamed DMG MORI Poland, but in everyday use and on customs documents, the factory is still referred to by its old name.

 

The company is now the largest manufacturer of machine tools in Poland and Central Europe. The firm is growing rapidly, supplying lathes, vertical milling machines, universal milling machines, as well as innovative automation systems. It currently employs 600 people. It is a strategic supplier of components to other plants within the DMG MORI group.

From 2017 to 2021, russia began buying up machine tools from the EU. Around half of these supplies came from Germany. Around half of the identified machine tools in Russia were also of German manufacture.

 

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate, the largest number of German machines – 148 – were manufactured by DMG Mori Seiki. At the single enterprise PJSC ‘ODK-Saturn’, which is part of the state-owned corporation ‘Rostec’ and produces engines for cruise missiles and military aircraft, there are at least 36 such machines.

The machines were imported by the Moscow-registered company DMG Mori Rus LLC. Deliveries continued even after the start of the full-scale war, meaning the company had its own representative office in the russian federation.

 

In the summer of 2022, the russian subsidiary supplied components for “ODK-Saturn” machine tools, prompting the NACP to add DMG Mori to its list of international sponsors of the war. At the time, the corporation stated that it had withdrawn from the russian market and was not involved in the supplies. This is not entirely true, as investigators uncovered such transactions worth over $1.2 million.

On 19 July 2024, vertical machining centres with a total value of over $100,000 were imported into the russian federation. The customs documents contained the standard wording: “Not for military use”. Country of origin – Poland, manufacturer – FAMOT PLESZEW SP. Z O.O. According to the markings, the EU classifies these machines as critical equipment that can be used in the production of weapons.

 

The recipient is the russian company Saturn EK LLC – a firm based in St Petersburg that has been on US sanctions lists since 2023. Its founder and director is Anna Ivanova. She is also the owner and director of EDLAUD LLC (retail sales of food products) and the director of Havana Cigar Club LLC (trade in tobacco products). Judging by Ivanova’s social media accounts, she travels abroad to conduct vape surfing training sessions and is, most likely, a front.

 

Until 2016, Yuri Skrotsky was listed as the founder of the firm ‘Saturn EK’ in the russian register of legal entities. He is also the owner of LLC ‘GC ’Snabzhenie", which is jointly owned by Vladimir Gavrilov and Dmitry Arkhipov. The latter are also co-owners of the aforementioned “Havana Cigar Club”, where Ivanova works as director. Thus, all these companies are interconnected.

According to available data (since the start of the major war, public procurement in the russian federation has become non-public), “GK “Snabzhenie” systematically fulfilled state contracts worth hundreds of millions of roubles. The largest customers were:

 

JSC “Morinsys-Agat” – a russian shipbuilding company specialising in the development, production and maintenance of combat information and control systems, as well as integrated automated control systems for naval formations, and fire control systems for cruise and ballistic missiles;

JSC ‘Izumrud’ – a developer of radar equipment;

 

JSC ‘NPK ’SPP" – one of the russian federation’s leading defence contractors, which manufactures aviation systems used in russian Su-27 fighter aircraft and Ka-52 attack helicopters;

JSC ‘NPZ’ – a russian manufacturer of small arms and surveillance optics, part of the ‘Rostec’ corporation;

JSC ‘Research Institute of Hydroacoustic Communications “Shtil”’ – the only enterprise in the russian federation specialising in the development of hydroacoustic communication equipment and hydroacoustic systems for search and rescue purposes for the russian Navy.

These companies are on the sanctions lists of various countries due to their involvement in russia’s war against Ukraine.

 

Until 24 February 2022, “Snabzhenie” positioned itself as a highly qualified supplier of electronic components and modules from leading foreign manufacturers (Altera, Xilinx, Analog Devices, Texas Instruments, Atmel, whose products continue to be used in russian missiles and drones to this day).

 

In 2022, the company’s official website was taken down. According to the russian legal register ‘Fedresurs’, in July of that year, ‘Snabzhenie’ Group leased equipment manufactured by DMG Mori.

After the start of the major war, ‘GK “Snabzhenie” supplied equipment to the Chelyabinsk radio plant ’Polet", which manufactures aviation equipment, in particular for the russian Ministry of Defence. This is stated in the decision of the Arbitration Court of the Chelyabinsk Region.

 

On 25 December 2023, the court partially upheld the claim in a case concerning a major contract under the state defence procurement programme. The court established that “Snabzhenie Group” had supplied goods to the “Polet” radio plant worth $868,000. This ruling also lists the delivery dates under the defence contract.

It is evident that individuals associated with “Saturn EK” are also linked to russia’s defence contracts. Further indirect evidence is that the company’s financial performance has increased significantly since the start of the major war.

High-precision equipment from the Polish factory Famot for “Saturn EK” was supplied by the Turkish company OTL Uluslararasi Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi – an entity that has been subject to sanctions by the EU, Ukraine and Switzerland since 2025.

 

According to sanctions authorities, the company is involved in re-export schemes used to conceal the ultimate russian recipients. Over the course of the war, this company has imported goods worth $2.5 million into the russian federation.

According to available customs data (up to and including March 2025), the last shipment of equipment manufactured by the Polish plant Famot took place on 30 November 2024. The value was nearly $82,000. The item in question is a horizontal CNC turning and milling machine manufactured in 2017, declared “for non-military purposes”.

 

The recipient is Kortisa LLC, registered in 2023 in Domodedovo, near Moscow. According to russian registers of legal entities, the company specialises in the manufacture of plywood, wooden boards, panels and wood cork.

In theory, a horizontal CNC turning and milling machine, supplied during the Great War, could be made to process even wood.

 

However, in practice, using equipment designed for steel and titanium – with cooling systems, a rigid structure and industrial load capacities – to produce ordinary wooden cork is a technological and economic absurdity. Such machines are designed for the production of shafts, bushings, housing components and complex assemblies with micron-level precision, i.e. for heavy engineering, not for woodworking.

 

With just two official employees, ‘Kortisa’ generated revenue of almost 100 million roubles, or around 1 million dollars, in 2024.

Investigators found another company in the russian register of legal entities with a similar name to ‘Kortisa’: ‘Kortis’ LLC, which supplies machine tools and machinery from abroad. It specialises “primarily in state and municipal contracts”. In particular, DMG Mori products were featured on its website.

 

The company’s revenue skyrocketed after 2022 and now amounts to billions of roubles. Before the war, this website published materials about the DMG Mori Academy in russia.

 

In customs data, the declarant is listed as Dmitry Kurashov, who is named as the company’s CEO on its website. Furthermore, he is the owner and director of “Kortis” according to the russian register of legal entities.

It is not known for certain whether this particular machine was supplied to any of the enterprises manufacturing weapons for the war or cooperating with the russian defence industry. However, investigators have identified a Turkish intermediary – the company Pyramid Muhendislik Ticaret Limited Sirketi – which supplied Polish Famot equipment to Kortisa LLC.

 

The company was registered in Istanbul in 2011 – according to its website. However, according to the Turkish register, it was founded in May 2023 by Bilal Ipek.

 

The company’s website lists Bilal’s contact details on one of the messaging apps. Posing as a manager at a russian company that works closely with the russian military-industrial complex, the journalist dialled the number without delay.

 

The phone conversation with Ipek began in a casual manner but quickly turned to the sensitive topic of sanctions and military contracts. After a brief introduction, the journalist explained the purpose of her call.

 

“Our company supplies equipment to the military in russia, and we are trying to find suppliers of European equipment due to the well-known situation, if you know what I mean. We are trying to find a CNC machine for our work, the CLX-350 model, manufactured by Famot.”

In response, Bilal asked for details without hesitation: “Do you need a new one or a used one?” Upon hearing that both options were possible, he moved straight to the main point: “What about payment? Are you aware of the sanctions?”

 

The journalist assured him: ‘We’ll try to find a solution; we have partners in other countries who can transfer the funds.’ The Turkish manager then described his own experience of circumventing the restrictions.

 

"Sometimes I work with other russian companies. I work with one bank. Occasionally, they allow us to deposit money in roubles. I also sold CNC machines to russia last year. I bought them in Europe and arranged an export transfer. In the end, we sold them. There are agents, you see?” he said.

 

Bilal confirmed that he was familiar with the brand in question, but asked for details of the configuration and even suggested an alternative. At the same time, a key condition for cooperation was stated: “But please, in no contract, in no letter, okay, on WhatsApp it’s fine, but in no contract and in no letter mention the military or anything like that, all right?”

 

After the call, the conversation continued via messenger.

Bilal sent a list of equipment ready for sale. Most of it was labelled as DMG Mori.

According to Bilal, supplying new equipment from DMG Mori would be difficult, but possible. Moreover, he confirmed that this had been done before.

 

The Turkish supplier has therefore confirmed its experience of supplying EU-made machine tools to russia following the imposition of sanctions, its willingness to seek financial solutions through banks and agents, and emphasised the need to avoid any mention of the equipment’s military use in official documents.

 

Colleagues from the Polish publication Frontstory sent enquiries to the Polish factory and its parent company. DMG Mori stated that they could not rule out the possibility that third parties might have purchased the equipment and exported it illegally.

 

“As a machine tool manufacturer, we take a firm stance against the unauthorised movement of equipment. To this end, we have developed RMS technology – Relocation Machine Security: a sensor detects if the machine has been moved and automatically shuts it down. It can only be restarted at a new location after being unlocked by a DMG MORI service technician.

 

We developed RMS technology in Japan many years ago, have continuously improved it, and have gradually rolled it out worldwide. From 1 January 2024, all DMG MORI machine tools worldwide will be equipped with the RMS system as standard. We are unable to track or monitor the location of older machine tools not equipped with RMS,” the response states.

 

Despite DMG MORI’s official statements regarding its complete withdrawal from the russian market back in 2022, high-precision machine tools from the Polish plant in Pleszew continue to find their way into russia via Turkish intermediaries who specialise in circumventing sanctions.

 

Turkish traders openly offer schemes to conceal the military purpose of the equipment in documentation, whilst the end recipients in russia are front companies linked to state contracts for key defence industry enterprises. This highlights a systemic vulnerability in the EU’s sanctions regime regarding dual-use goods.

 

Source: Ekonomichna Pravda